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ANALYSING PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT IN PUBLIC
SERVICES: HOW USEFUL IS THE CONCEPT OF A
PERFORMANCE REGIME?
STEVE MARTIN, SANDRA NUTLEY, JAMES DOWNE
AND CLIVE GRACE
Approaches to performance assessment have been described as ‘performance regimes’, but there
has been little analysis of what is meant by this concept and whether it has any real value. We draw
on four perspectives on regimes – ‘institutions and instruments’, ‘risk regulation regimes’, ‘internal
logics and effects’ and ‘analytics of government’ – to explore how the concept of amulti-dimensional
regime can be applied to performance assessment in public services. We conclude that the concept
is valuable. It helps to frame comparative and longitudinal analyses of approaches to performance
assessment and draws attention to the ways in which public service performance regimes operate
at different levels, how they change over time and what drives their development. Areas for future
research include analysis of the impacts of performance regimes and interactions between their visi-
ble features (such as inspections, performance indicators and star ratings) and the veiled rationalities
which underpin them.
INTRODUCTION
How closely, in what ways and by whom the performance of public sector organizations
should be assessed is a topic that has been hotly debated by scholars of public administra-
tion as well as policy-makers and practitioners (Van Dooren et al. 2010). In recent years,
these questions have been accompanied by a growing concern about how to improve
public service performance. A range of approaches to performance assessment have been
adopted at different times, in different services and across different jurisdictions, and dur-
ing the past decade a number of scholars have described these as ‘performance regimes’
(Roper et al. 2005; Grubnic and Woods 2009; Moynihan 2009; Moynihan et al. 2011; Char-
bonneau and Bellavance 2012). However, they have used the concept of a ‘regime’ in a
general sense rather than as an analytical tool.What constitutes a performance regime – its
distinguishing features and dimensions – has not been entirely clear.
The concept of a regime has been employed in several fields, including international
relations, international law, urban policy and political science, to analyse governance pro-
cesses at international, national and local levels, and regime theory has been applied to
particular aspects of governance, including policy problems (Mays and Jochim 2013) and
risk regulation (Hood et al. 2001). A common thread running through the application of the
concept of a regime in these different contexts is that it encourages an analytical approach
which explores the interactions among institutions and interest groups andways in which
these are mediated by formal and informal rules and cultures. This has the potential to
support both comparative and longitudinal studies of governance arrangements. Stud-
ies often focus on visible interactions and espoused rationalities, but there is also a more
reflexive form of regime theory – the analytics of government approach – which seeks to
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uncover the often hidden or invisible rationalities that sit behind particular modes of gov-
ernance (Dean 1999).
On the face of it, then, employing the concept of regimes to analyse approaches to per-
formance assessments in public sector settings should be revealing. However, there have
been very few comparative analyses of performance assessment and no attempts to apply
the concept of a regime to this task. As a result, there is an important gap in our knowl-
edge about the value of the concept in this domain. This article seeks to address the gap
by examining how the concept can be developed to advance understanding of the origins
and operation of approaches to performance assessment. It does this empirically and ana-
lytically by exploring how four perspectives on regimes can help us to understand three
recent approaches to performance assessment in UK local government.
The article addresses four specific questions. First, is a regimes perspective a useful
way of identifying and analysing differences between approaches to performance assess-
ment in public services? Second, at what level of analysis is the concept of a performance
regimemost useful? Third, can it help to explain differences in approaches to performance
assessment between jurisdictions and over time? Finally, how might the concept of a per-
formance regime be developed in the future to advance our understanding of approaches
to performance assessment? In answering these questions, the article makes an important
contribution to investigating the applicability of the concept of a regime to the study of
performance assessment.
The next section focuses on four approaches to regime analysis which are particularly
relevant to the study of performance assessment in the public sector. Following this, we
explain our methods and data sources. Then we apply the concept of a performance
regime to analyse approaches to the assessment of local government performance in
England, Scotland and Wales. We describe the main characteristics of the approaches,
the interactions between the actors who developed them and the instruments that they
used. We conclude by examining our four research questions in light of this empirical
analysis, reflecting on the implications of our research for the application of the concept
of performance regimes to the study of public service organizations and suggesting areas
for future research.
REGIME THEORY AND PERFORMANCE REGIMES
All of the literatures in which the concept has been adopted identify a regime as consisting
of interactions among actors (variously described as interest groups, coalitions and institu-
tions) who operate within relatively stable systems characterized by formal and informal
rules and cultures (e.g. Krasner 1982). Regimes can be forced upon actors by external cir-
cumstances, but while government actors are usually regarded as the principal architects
of regimes, they need not necessarily bemandated or imposed by a hierarchical state (Beb-
bington et al. 2012).
Debates about the usefulness of a regimes perspective in international relations and
urban studies (e.g. Strange 1982) provide insights into some of the potential benefits and
limitations of applying the concept to the study of performance assessments of public ser-
vice organizations. There are, however, four specific contributions that are particularly
relevant for our development and application of the concept: Talbot’s (2010) depiction
of the institutions and instruments that make up a performance regime; the framework
developed by Hood et al. (2001) to analyse approaches to risk regulation; the analysis by
Pollitt et al. (2010) of the impact of exogenous shocks and internal logics on performance
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indicator sets; and Dean’s (1999) analytics of government framework, which draws atten-
tion to the importance of invisible rationalities that shape regimes of practices.
Talbot was one of the first scholars to apply the term ‘regime’ to approaches to perfor-
mance management in the public sector (Talbot et al. 2005; Talbot 2010). He argues that
performance is shaped and steered by interactions among a multitude of institutions and
instruments. Institutions which can play a role in regulating the performance of public
service organizations include the legislature, executive, judicial and quasi-judicial bodies;
audit, inspection and regulatory bodies; professional institutes; partner organizations;
user organizations; and service providers. Talbot (2010) suggests that, individually and
collectively, these actors have access to a range of instruments, and illustrates this by
reference to four strategies that were deployed by the Blair government in the UK in
an attempt to improve public service performance: managerial–contractual instruments
(performance reporting, contracts, targets and national minimum standards); markets and
quasi-markets (competitive tendering, benchmarking and performance league tables);
pressure from service users; and interventions designed to enhance capability and capac-
ity (for example, capability reviews, leadership programmes, changes in human resource
practices and structural reorganizations).
Hood et al.’s (2001) analysis is particularly useful for our study because it makes the
concept of a regime tractable, and the dimensions which it identifies connect with debates
about performance assessment. They argue that risk regulation regimes consist of sets of
interacting or interrelated parts which form relatively bounded systems that have a degree
of continuity over time and can be specified at different levels of breadth or generality.
They analyse regimes in terms of three features: the ‘context’ within which they operate;
their ‘content’ (institutional configurations); and the ‘control mechanisms’ that they
deploy. According to Hood et al. (2001), examining these three cross-cutting dimensions
of a regime makes it possible to capture ‘the complex of institutional geography, rules,
practice, and animating ideas that are associated with the regulation of a particular risk
or hazard’ (2001, p. 9).
They argue that the concept of a regime offers four principal benefits in the context of risk
regulation. First, because it deals in dimensional systems rather than unified phenomena,
it enables the identification and cataloguing of similarities and differences in approaches
to regulating risk. Second, by emphasizing the interconnectedness of the different compo-
nents of the system, it guards against overemphasizing the role of elites. Third, it is able
to identify variations in approaches to regulation that are not readily observable through
single case studies or broader, macroscopic approaches. Fourth, the concept of a regime
is sufficiently flexible to be applied to an entire regulatory system or to a selected com-
ponent or components. By way of illustration, they suggest that it can be used to study
risk regulation across a whole healthcare system or to analyse risk management within a
sub-system – for example, considering the problems posed by ‘dangerous doctors’.
Pollitt et al. (2010) use the language of a ‘regime’ to compare the use of performance
indicators in the English and Dutch healthcare systems over a 25-year period. Their ana-
lysis shows that broad institutional patterns (particularly cultural and political systems
and approaches to organizing and funding healthcare) have a significant influence on
the development of performance measurement systems, and are important in explaining
stabilities in a system. They suggest that ‘punctuations’ in policy pathways (such as the
introduction of national performance indicators) result from a combination of exogenous
crises and contingent, opportunistic behaviour by individual actors. However, once per-
formance indicators become embedded in a system, they are sustained by endogenous
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mechanisms of reproduction which display a ‘logic of escalation’. Performance indicators
provide new opportunities for a range of actors to advance their interests, and as a result
the ‘systems themselves evolve in a manner that makes it difficult to imagine how they
could ever be abandoned’ (p. 26). Pollitt et al. conclude that, in conducting a longitudinal
analysis of performance regimes, a broad institutional analysis needs to be complemented
by particular attention to major changes of course and detailed consideration of the inter-
nal logics (and external political effects) of particular policy technologies.
Dean’s (1999) analytics of government framework encourages us to pay attention to
invisible rationalities that sit behind particular modes of governance. He emphasizes the
importance of three elements of a regime: the way inwhich it problematizes the behaviour
which is in need of governance; how the governing activity is achieved (regimes of prac-
tice); and the utopian ideal towardwhich the governing activity is directed.With regard to
how the governing activity is achieved, Dean highlights four axes alongwhich the regimes
of practice need to be considered: the visibilities created by governance processes and by
the use of particular techniques; the knowledge generated by and usedwithin governance
processes; the techniques and practices used to achieve the governance (and which may
create visibilities, knowledge and identities); and the identities which emerge from and
support governance processes.
In this article, we draw upon the frameworks provided by Talbot, Hood et al., Pollitt
et al. and Dean to analyse three approaches to local government performance assessment
introduced in different parts of the UK: Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA)
in England, Best Value Audits (BVA) in Scotland and the Wales Programme for Improve-
ment (WPI). These ‘whole-organization assessments’ (WOAs) were at the forefront of an
attempt to drive performance improvement in local public services in the UK which has
attracted considerable attention from scholars and policy-makers round the world. Pre-
vious research has described, and frequently criticized, deficiencies in the methodologies
used in WOAs (Andrews et al. 2005; Downe and Martin 2007; McLean et al. 2007). There
have also been discussions of their impact on local government performance (Downe et al.
2010; Nutley et al. 2012). But there has been a lack of analysis of how and why they were
developed and how they were implemented. This article addresses this gap through a
comparative analysis which shows how the concept of a regime can be applied to advance
understanding of the origins and operation of approaches to performance assessment, and
what shapes the approaches that are taken.
METHODS AND DATA
We studied the development and implementation of CPA, BVA and the WPI in detail
over the period 2002–09 and continued to track subsequent changes in the approaches
adopted in all three countries until 2014. Data were gathered from three sources: analy-
sis of policy documents, legislation and statutory and non-statutory guidance; in-depth
semi-structured interviews with 45 senior policy-makers and practitioners from central
government, audit bodies, improvement agencies and local government, all of whom had
been closely involved in the development or implementation of the performance regimes
in their respective countries (see Table 1); and a workshop with a wider group of stake-
holders from all three countries to discuss our emerging findings.
We were granted access to all of the main actors (including politicians and officials in
central and local government and senior officials from the audit bodies that were responsi-
ble for conducting the assessments) in each country. This enabled us to build up a very rich
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TABLE 1 Interviewees
Organizations Roles
England (15 interviews)
Audit Commission Chief Executive, Former Chief Executive, Former Head of District
Audit
Cabinet Office Former special adviser to the Prime Minister on health and local
government policy
Department of Communities and
Local Government
Former Minister of State for Local Government
Department of Constitutional Affairs Former Parliamentary Under-Secretary
Improvement & Development
Agency
Executive Director, Former Executive Director
Local authorities Six Chief Executives
Local Government Association Former Chief Executive
Scotland (16 interviews)
Accounts Commission Secretary to the Commission, Member
Audit Scotland Auditor General, Deputy Auditor General, Director of Public
Reporting, Assistant Director of Public Reporting
Convention of Scottish Local
Authorities
Strategic Director
Improvement Service Chief Executive
Local authorities Three Chief Executives and one Assistant Chief Executive
Scottish Government Best Value Policy Manager, Former Head of Justice Department,
Former Minister of Finance, Head of Best Value and Performance
Wales (14 interviews)
Audit Commission in Wales District Auditor
Local authorities Three Chief Executives
Wales Audit Office Performance specialist
Welsh Government Minister for Social Justice and Local Government, Former Senior
Special Adviser to the First Minister, Director of Department of
Constitutional Affairs, Equality and Communication, Head of
Local Government Policy, Head of Local Government Strategy
and Performance, Former Head of Local Government Policy
Welsh Local Government Association Chief Executive, Performance and Improvement Adviser, Director
of Governance and Improvement
picture of theWOAs and the context within which they operated. Interviewees were iden-
tified from the documentary analysis combined with a snowballing approach whereby
additional actors were suggested by early interviewees. Interviews covered a range of
questions about the approaches toWOAs, how they linked towider performance improve-
ment initiatives in their country, how they had been developed, what factors shaped their
design and implementation and their perceived outcomes. They were taped and tran-
scribed. By triangulating the responses of all interviewees in each country, we were able
to construct a rounded picture of how and why the WOAs had been developed and how
they operated in practice. Wewere also able to identify areas of agreement and dissonance
between the accounts provided by different actors. Evidence from the documentary anal-
ysis and the workshop enabled us to mitigate the risk of elite interviewees exaggerating
their own roles in and influence over the design and development of the WOAs.
Our subsequent tracking of approaches to performance assessment at the whole-
authority level since 2009 has drawn on documentary evidence and five knowledge-
exchange events which brought together more than 70 senior policy-makers, auditors,
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inspectors and local government representatives from all three countries to analyse and
compare developments in local government performance assessment across the UK.
ANALYSINGWHOLE-ORGANIZATION ASSESSMENTS AS PERFORMANCE
REGIMES
Local governments in the UK are responsible for a wide range of services, including edu-
cation, social services, housing, planning, waste collection and management, leisure and
culture, consumer protection and local highways. They also have a role in seeking to pro-
mote economic growth and providing community leadership. In Scotland,Wales andmost
urban areas in England there is a unitary system of local government (i.e. one organization
is responsible for all of these services and functions). In some areas in England, responsi-
bility is shared between an upper tier of local government (county councils) and a lower
tier (district councils) (Wilson and Game 2006).
In the UK, central government determines what powers are given to local governments
and how much they can spend. As a result, policy-making is highly centralized. National
politicians exert considerable influence over local government’s spending decisions and
take a direct interest in its performance. Historically, the devolved governments in Scot-
land and Wales have been more inclined than the UK government (responsible for local
government in England) to work in partnership with local government (Midwinter and
McGarvey 2001;McConnell 2006;Martin et al. 2013). Until relatively recently,Wales in par-
ticular has adopted a policy of ‘soft steering’ local authorities (Martin andGuarneros-Meza
2013). This more consensual approach reflects the close-knit nature of the policy com-
munities in Scotland and Wales and the limited administrative capacity of the devolved
governments, which has obliged them to look to local government for policy input (Laffin
2004; Jeffery 2006). In recent years, however, the relationships have become more conflict-
ual and the Scottish and Welsh governments have adopted more hierarchical approaches
in their dealings with local government.
Applying the concept of a performance regime to CPA, BVA and the WPI enables
us to identify and examine the ways in which interactions between central and local
government and other actors determine how WOAs operate and the ways in which
they are mediated by formal and informal rules and cultures. In this section we deploy
Hood et al.’s (2001) framework as the main way of structuring our analysis of the three
WOAs. Insights offered by the frameworks developed by Talbot (2010), Pollitt et al.
(2010) and Dean (1999) are used to supplement this analysis by providing additional
interpretations and understandings. This combination of four different – but, we believe,
complementary – theoretical perspectives enables us to undertake an analysis which is
both cross-sectional, in that we make comparisons across the three approaches to WOA,
and longitudinal, in that we trace developments over time.
Applying the concept of regimes at different levels of generality: varying institutions
and instruments
As explained above, Hood et al. (2001) argue that risk regulation regimes can be specified
at different levels of breadth or generality. We found that it was possible and indeed neces-
sary to do this because theWOAs in each countrywere situatedwithin broader approaches
to performance assessment and improvement, and as Talbot (2010) suggests, we found that
it was helpful to map the key institutions and instruments involved at different levels of
regime analysis.
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FIGURE 1 Local government performance improvement regimes in the UK
We identified three ‘nested’ sets of regimes which illustrate how regimes can be nar-
rowly defined or more broadly constructed (May and Jochim 2013). At the ‘lowest’ level
were WOAs. These operated as bounded systems that could be analysed in their own
right. However, their boundaries were permeable, since WOAs were part of a ‘second
level’ of broader improvement regimes which consisted of a wider range of instruments
(including government grants, reporting requirements, concordats and contracts, and
statutory performance indicators) that were intended to work together to promote
improvements in local government performance (figure 1). We found that there were
interactions between the WOAs and this wider array of instruments. For example, the
criteria used to assess local government performance in CPAs in England were strongly
influenced by the priorities and performance targets set out in Local Area Agreements
made between central government departments and individual local governments. In
Scotland, assessors used statutory performance indicators to inform BVAs. In all three
countries, critical WOA reports could trigger external support, including the insertion of
interim management teams to try to ‘turn around’ the performance of ‘failing councils’.
These second-level performance improvement regimes were themselves situated
within a higher (third) level of public service reform strategies which were developed
by the three national governments in conjunction with a range of other institutional
actors. For example, the use of ‘star ratings’ as a means of identifying and incentivizing
improvement in local government in England reflected the UK government’s belief in the
value of creating competition between local governments and was echoed in the use of
the same instruments in a range of public service delivery settings, including hospitals.
By contrast, until 2011 the Welsh government’s public service reform agenda explicitly
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rejected the use of star ratings (and ‘naming and shaming’) and the WPI was in line with
this approach (Bevan and Wilson 2013).
We found that the key institutions involved and the influence they wielded varied
between these three different levels of analysis. For example, WOAs were largely shaped
by three key sets of actors: the central government department with responsibility for
local government policy, the principal local government audit body and the local gov-
ernment associations (bodies which represent and promote the collective interests of
local governments). At this level of analysis, many of the institutions that Talbot (2010)
suggests might make up a performance regime, including other central government
departments, service-specific inspectorates (such as the inspectorates for schools), pro-
fessional institutes, business interests and the voluntary sector had little discernible
influence, and the legislatures and judiciary also had only minor roles. However, at the
second level, approaches to local government performance improvement involved a
wider range of central government departments including those with responsibility for
finance, education, environment, transport and health. At the third level of public services
reform strategies (which is the level at which Talbot applied the concept of a perfor-
mance regime), a wider set of actors came into play, including business interests, public
service user groups and public policy think-tanks. Audit bodies and local government
associations exerted much less influence than at the WOA level.
So, we found that Talbot’s description of a performance regime provided a helpful
framework for identifying the key institutions and instruments involved in promoting
performance improvement in local government at different levels. Applying the frame-
work at different levels helped to remind us of the need not just to analyse the interactions
among institutions at the level of WOAs, but also to take account of the interactions
between WOAs and the higher-level local government performance improvement sys-
tems and public service reform strategies within which they are embedded. But mapping
institutions and instruments was not sufficient, because it did not identify or account for
the differences between England, Scotland and Wales in the ways in which WOAs were
developed and implemented. The same institutions and instruments shown in figure 1
were involved in all three countries, but differences in the ways in which they interacted
gave each of the regimes a distinct ‘feel’. To understand this we needed to analyse the
origins and operation of the WOAs in detail, and the concept of a regime articulated by
Hood et al. (2001) provided the most useful framework for doing this.
Regime context, content and control
Hood et al. (2001) argue that the context and content of a regime shape, and in turn are
shaped by, the way in which control is exercised. So our analysis of CPA, BVA and the
WPI considers these three dimensions of the WOAs in turn.
Hood et al. (2001) identify three important features of the context within which risk reg-
ulation regimes operate: the type of risk which they regulate; public attitudes toward the
risk; and the nature of organized interests which have a stake in its regulation. We found
that all three of these elements proved important to understanding the three WOAs and
the differences between them. The type of risk that WOAs were intended to regulate was
a complex and contested issue. Some interviewees (particularly those working in local
government) defined WOAs as a way of identifying the relatively small minority of local
governments that were failing tomeet basic standards of service. Others (mostly in central
government) thought that they targeted a much broader spectrum, including what they
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described as ‘coasting councils’ (a relatively large number of organizations whose perfor-
mance was near the average and which central government believed should be aspiring
to do much better).
Our analysis suggested that public preferences and attitudes did not influence WOAs
directly. The performance of local government mattered to central government ministers
but interviewees believed it had low public salience, partly because few citizens under-
stand which services UK local government provides (Ipsos MORI 2004). There was no
direct public involvement in the process of assessing performance, although some inter-
viewees believed that the results of WOAs would empower citizens to hold their local
governments to account. The architects of CPA in England insisted that publishing results
in the form of ‘star ratings’ would increase transparency and spark public interest in per-
formance (Audit Commission 2002). CPA results for all upper tier and unitary local gov-
ernments were published every year and on the same day to encourage comparisons
between them, and there is evidence that this had an impact on voting intentions where
local governments received poor ratings (James and John 2007). In Scotland, BVA reports
were published, but not on the same day, and they did not give local governments an
overall score, which meant that the ‘headline message’ was much less clear-cut than in
England. In Wales, WPI reports were not published at all, nor were they seen by central
government. The audit body produced an annual report of its overall findings but this
contained no information about individual local governments. This level of secrecy meant
that the public had no way of knowing how well their local government was performing
and became a source of increasing frustration to ministers who were unable to use WPI
reports to monitor each organization’s progress.
As suggested by Hood et al. (2001), the nature of the organized interests also emerged
as an important factor in shaping the three regimes we studied, and it was key to under-
standing variations between them. As noted above, the same institutions – government
departments, audit bodies and local government associations – were involved in all three
countries. However, differences in central–local relations and the distribution of power
among the institutions led to significant differences between theWOAs. In England, CPAs
were designed by senior Audit Commission officials and imposed top-down. The Audit
Commission reported to senior civil servants and special advisers in the (then) Depart-
ment of Transport, Local Government and theRegions. The LocalGovernmentAssociation
was not closely involved and although a small group of local governments were invited to
pilot the process, this did not result in any fundamental change to the Audit Commission’s
original proposals.
In Scotland, the process for designing BVAs was much more inclusive and consensual,
with local government enjoying far greater influence. A task force with representation
from the Scottish government, Audit Scotland, local government, trades unions, profes-
sional organizations and the Scottish Consumer Council designed the regime and as a
result it enjoyed a high level of support. In Wales, the WPI was developed by a tripartite
group of senior civil servants, Audit Commission officials and the Welsh Local Govern-
ment Association. Local government had strong support from the minister and exerted
considerable influence. The auditors found themselves in a much weaker position than
their counterparts in England or Scotland and were handed a regime that they believed
had been captured by producer interests and lacked sufficient rigour and transparency.
Turning to regime content,Hood et al. (2001) identify three elements – size, structure and
style. Size refers to howmuch regulation is brought to bear on a risk. Structure refers to the
way in which regulation is organized (the distribution of regulatory costs, the complexity
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of the system and interfaces with other regimes). Style refers to the conventions and atti-
tudes of those operating a regime, including the degree of ‘regulatory zeal’ they bring and
the formal and informal processes through which regulation operates. Like the concept of
context, these proved useful in our analysis, although not all were equally enlightening.
Hood et al. (2001) identify two measures of regime size – ‘policy aggression’ and the
level of investment in a regime.We found variations in ‘aggression’, which in turn reflected
the differences in policy and in central–local relations, as well as beliefs about the best way
to motivate local governments to improve their performance (what we have described
elsewhere as ‘theories of improvement’ (Downe et al. 2010)). CPAswere perceived by inter-
viewees to be very aggressive. The ‘naming and shaming’ of ‘poor’ performers was, they
said, intended to provide a ‘shock to the system’. The Audit Commission also invested
heavily in CPA. As noted above, it conducted annual assessments of all 151 upper tier and
unitary local governments in England, plus less frequent CPAs in the 201 district (lower
tier) councils. CPAs cost £28m per annum to administer (House of Commons 2013) and
also consumed significant amounts of local government time in preparing the documents
and performance data required by assessors, hosting visits by them and responding to
reports. The estimated costs of compliance vary between £25m and £45m annually (OPM
2010).
The Audit Commission also invested a great deal of its own political capital in CPA.
According to the senior Audit Commission officials who designed it, it was seen as a
way of restoring the audit body’s reputation with ministers following what was seen as
the botched implementation of the ‘Best Value’ inspections which preceded it. It proved
spectacularly successful in this regard, and between 2003 and 2008 the Audit Commis-
sion enjoyed a period of unprecedented expansion and influencewith central government.
However, growing resentment towardCPAamong local politicians eventually contributed
to the Audit Commission’s demise when there was a change of central government in
2010 and ministers declared that the audit body had ‘lost its way’ and must be abolished
(Shapps 2011).
The WPI was also seen as time-consuming and resource-intensive but was less oner-
ous than CPA. As one interviewee explained, it was felt that there was no need in a small
country for ‘an over-engineered system like CPA’. Each local government was required to
prepare a self-assessment each year. In parallel, auditors conducted their own ‘risk assess-
ments’ and the two parties then agreed improvement plans. In contrast to the ‘external
shock’ provided by CPA, the aim was that local governments would identify and take
responsibility for addressing their weaknesses since, as an interviewee from the Welsh
government explained, ‘change which is owned by local government is more sustainable
and ultimatelymore effective’. BecauseWPI reports on individual local governmentswere
unpublished, theWPI was not perceived as aggressive or intrusive. One local government
chief executive explained that ‘performance and improvement dominate my life but the
Wales Programme for Improvement doesn’t’.
BVA was perceived to be far less aggressive than CPA, but more challenging than the
WPI. According to one interviewee, ‘you don’t need strong arm tactics … [because]
the community is close enough that word gets round quickly’. Scale was also impor-
tant because, according to another interviewee, with just 32 local government units in
Scotland, ‘we can capture what is truly happening in local councils through this kind
of [flexible] methodology’. Because BVAs were conducted on a three-year cycle, they
required less investment (by the auditors and local governments) than their English or
Welsh counterparts.
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The structural dimensions of the three regimes were not a significant distinguishing fea-
ture, but were important in explaining change over time. The distribution of costs between
regulators and regulatees was similar in all three countries. In all three cases, assessors
drew on information from self-assessments but used a variety of evidence to supplement
this. Local governments everywhere complained of the burden of compliance costs and
a lack of ‘joining up’ with service-specific inspectorates which led to multiple requests
for similar information. From 2009 onwards, the complexity of the system, particularly
the interfaces with other performance assessments, became a distinguishing feature of the
ways in which the regimes developed. CPA was able to operate in relative isolation from
other performance assessment and service-specific inspection regimes (mainly using them
as sources of data for input into the CPA process), but CPA was replaced in 2009 by Com-
prehensive Area Assessments (CAA), which required more collaborative working across
inspection agencies.
Similarly, developments in the Scottish BVA regime after 2009 included a new system of
shared risk assessments, which require Audit Scotland towork togetherwith other inspec-
torates to agree on the key risks in each local government and to coordinate an inspection
plan to address these risks. In Wales, the Local Government Measure (2009) made signif-
icant changes to the WPI. The focus shifted from risk assessment to securing continuous
improvement, efforts weremade to improve coordination between inspectorates and local
governments were required to release performance data to the public.
In terms of style, all three regimes exhibited a high degree of rule orientation which was
designed to ensure transparency aboutmethods and consistency of approach in the assess-
ment of local government. All threewere based on the assumption that ‘corporate capacity’
is vital to improvement. They therefore sought to test the effectiveness of a local govern-
ment’s political and managerial leadership, its clarity of purpose, its use of resources, and
performance management systems. CPA assessors used a standardized methodology and
scoring system based on ‘key lines of enquiry’ which focused on these issues as well as
the performance of key services delivered by local governments. BVAs andWPIs adopted
more flexible approaches designed to respond to variations in local context and the pri-
orities defined by each local government. However, they used similar judgement criteria
to CPA, and interviewees from Scotland reported that in practice the process was not as
customized or as useful as they hoped. BVA reports are about ‘the weakness of corpo-
rate governance first and foremost’, said one local government interviewee, while another
suggested that ‘they are like a report card on the chief executive’.
The level of ‘regulatory zeal’ varied between the regimes. Auditors in England and Scot-
land were strongly committed to CPAs and BVAs, respectively; their Welsh counterparts
were less convinced about the value of the WPI. This reflected differences in central–local
government relations described above, and in particular the close relationship between
ministers and the Welsh Local Government Association. One interviewee admitted that
‘probably too much was done by conversations between me and XXX … I always felt
really uncomfortable that we weren’t doing all of that stuff formally’.
As explained above, in addition to context and content, Hood et al. (2001) emphasize
the importance of control mechanisms in shaping a regime. They identify three types of
controls – the ways in which standards are set (directors), how information is gathered
to check if standards are being met (detectors) and how behaviour is modified to ensure
compliancewith the standards (effectors). The key control mechanisms in each of the three
WOAs are summarized in table 2.
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TABLE 2 The exercise of control within CPA, BVA and WPI
Standard setting Information gathering Behaviour modification
‘Directors’ ‘Detectors’ ‘Effectors’
England:
Comprehensive
Performance
Assessments
(CPA)
Uniform rules-based
scoring system reflecting
national priorities.
An element of
self-assessment but
largely auditor-led using
key lines of enquiry.
Naming and
shaming – overall scores
published alongside
narrative reports.
Staged escalation of sanctions
and interventions.
Criteria for assessing
service performance
tightly defined.
Some peer and
capacity-building support
for improvement efforts.
Corporate assessment
criteria more
impressionistic.
Scotland: Best Value
Audits (BVA)
Standards articulated at
level of principles.
Initial self-assessment, but
then auditor-led.
Narrative BVA reports placed
in public domain.
Tailored application
depending on local
priorities.
No scoring of performance
against standards.
Some sanctions for poor
performance but treated as
a last resort.
Focus on education and
persuasion through
agreeing an improvement
plan.
Wales: Wales
Programme for
Improvement
(WPI)
Principle-based standards. Emphasis on
self-assessment.
Joint risk assessments
confidential to auditors and
each local council.
Tailored to each council
through joint risk
assessment process
(auditors working with
each council).
No scoring of performance
against standards. Jointly agreed improvement
plan.
Emphasis on self-directed
improvement.
Intervention as a last resort.
CPA exercised control through setting explicit, rules-based standards that were
designed to be applied in a fairly uniform manner to all local governments. There was an
element of self-assessment but, in practice, information gathering was largely auditor-led.
Performance scores were published in league tables and behaviour modification mecha-
nisms emphasized naming and shaming. This was complemented by a staged escalation
of sanctions and interventions combined with resources for capacity-building and peer
support.
By contrast, in Wales, performance standards were influenced by broad principles
rather than specific rules and were applied selectively on the basis of a risk assessment
undertaken by auditors in conjunction with each local government. Self-assessment
played a much stronger role in the process of information gathering and this was
reflected in the approach to behaviour modification, which emphasized self-directed
improvement.
The approach to control in the BVA regime can be characterized as sitting between
the standardized, rule-based and punitive approach of CPA and the customized, joint
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assessment and improvement approach of the WPI. BVA standards were articulated as
principles to be applied in a way which recognized the particular circumstances in each
locality. Although information gathering began with a self-assessment process, it was
largely led by auditors. BVA reports were placed in the public domain, but the bespoke
nature of each report muted this ‘effector’ and in practice more emphasis was placed
on informal negotiation behind the scenes, which resulted in the development of an
improvement plan agreed between the auditors and local government.
In summary, the framework developed by Hood et al. (2001) proved very useful as a
means of documenting the key characteristics ofWOAs, comparing them and understand-
ing the reasons for the differences that we observed. However, we found that the regimes
evolved over time. This raised the question of whether applying a regimes perspective can
assist longitudinal as well as comparative analysis.
Understanding change over time
Pollitt et al. (2010) argue that performance regimes are relatively stable but are subject to
development and change over time due to endogenous growth and exogenous shocks.
Thus cross-sectional analysis cannot tell thewhole story of a regime; a temporal dimension
is also important. Our analysis bears this out, as all three WOAs developed over time
and we found that changes were driven by a combination of endogenous and exogenous
factors.
CPA and BVA became more formalized and sophisticated. There were changes in the
criteria they used (the key lines of enquiry), in resource requirements and in reporting
arrangements. Interviewees attributed these to the need for audit bodies to respond to
external challenges to the validity and reliability of the regimes. As predicted by Pollitt et
al., they also exhibited an internal logic of escalation. CPAwas first applied to unitary and
upper tier local governments but then extended to the lower tier districts. The performance
criteria used in assessments were expanded with the introduction in 2005 of a so-called
‘harder test’ and the introduction of CAA in 2008 which placed increased emphasis on the
need for public services to work in partnership. But the biggest exogenous shock to the
system in England was the election of the Conservative-led coalition government in 2010,
which led to the abolition of the Audit Commission and the introduction of a process of
voluntary assessment known as Corporate Peer Challenge in place of mandatory external
assessment by the audit body.
Developments in the BVA regime in Scotland after 2009 were also shaped by changes in
the broader public services reform strategy taken by central government. As in England,
the Scottish government placed greater emphasis on partnership working. Community
Planning Partnerships (involving health, the police and other agencies) were given a
central role in the delivery of public services and this meant that Audit Scotland had
to adapt BVAs to assess their performance rather than focusing solely on local govern-
ment. As described above, the way in which the WPI in Wales operated was refined in
2005 and then again in 2009. Here too there have been major changes in the broader
performance assessment regime as a result of external shocks. The publication of PISA
(Programme for International Student Assessment) scores indicating that educational
attainment in Wales lags behind the rest of the UK led to the introduction of ‘banding’
of schools on the basis of external education inspection scores, and serious failures
in other local services triggered external intervention in a number of local govern-
ments and an independent review of public service governance and delivery (Welsh
Government 2014).
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Having applied the concept of a regime to the analysis of approaches to UK local govern-
ment performance assessment, we now return to the four specific questions raised at the
beginning of this article.
Is a regimes perspective a useful way of identifying and analysing differences
between approaches to performance assessment in public services?
Our analysis supports the claim ofMay and Jochim (2013, p. 42) that ‘the regime lens helps
to illuminate the realities of how a given set of problems is addressed and the political
dynamics that are engendered by those realities’. The ‘risk regulation’ and ‘institutions and
instruments’ frameworks offered by Hood et al. (2001) and Talbot (2010) are both helpful
in characterizing the contrasting approaches to performance assessment in England, Scot-
land and Wales. We find the more detailed parameters of the risk regulation framework
to be the most useful when it comes to analysing differences between the three regimes at
theWOA level, while the institutions and instruments perspective is important in helping
to maintain a sense of the wider regime.
Our analysis also demonstrates the importance of drawing on a range of evidence in
investigating the various dimensions of the risk regulation framework. The high-level
policy documents that we analysed emphasized the differences in approach in the three
countries, partly because of a desire by devolved administrations to differentiate their
policies from those of the UK government operating in England (Nutley et al. 2012).
Audit manuals focus on the formal rules, practices, tools and techniques associated
with a regime, which appeared to be similar across all three countries. Interviews gave
insights into the informal (sometimes hidden) processes which lay behind regimes,
which meant that they ‘felt’ very different ‘on the ground’. As an interviewee in Scotland
explained, ‘although many aspects of public service audit and inspection in England
and Scotland look as if they are converging, the overall feel of these regimes … is
different’.
At what level of analysis is the concept of a performance regime most useful?
Our analysis demonstrates that the concept of a regime can be applied at different lev-
els of analysis. We have examined how a single policy initiative (WOAs) operates at a
national level (across all local governments). This is distinct from a more micro-level anal-
ysis of howWOAs play out in particular local governments, a meso-level approach which
focuses on all of the instruments which make up a local government performance regime
or a macro-level approach that investigates an entire public service reform strategy. Anal-
ysis of specific local governments would have the advantage of offering a detailed and
nuanced account of how a regime is implemented in a particular context, but raises ques-
tions about the external validity of a small number of cases. Meso- and macro-level anal-
yses are good at highlighting the broader context with in which specific policy initia-
tives operate. However, they run the risk of focusing on policy intentions rather than
how policies are implemented on the ground. We suggest that a regimes perspective can
be used at all of these levels, but that the analysis of a specific instrument at national
level has an important contribution to make to understanding its origins and operation.
It could be enriched by drawing on data from studies conducted at micro, meso and
macro levels.
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Can the concept of a performance regime help to explain differences in approaches
to performance assessment between jurisdictions and over time?
Although regimes are conceptualized as relatively stable systems, our study shows that
a regime analysis should not be limited to characterizing how the system works at a
particular point in time. Hood et al. (2001) point out that it is the ‘relationship profile’
between the elements in the regime that is important, and our analysis shows that these
are not static relationships. Examining the interactions between the various institutions
and instruments involved in a regime sheds light on the way it changes over time and
why. Pollitt et al. (2010) are right to also draw attention to the internal logics of escalation
embedded within a regime and the way that significant shifts in a regime are caused by
exogenous shocks. This is in line with Hood et al.’s conclusion that it is context rather than
the inner lives of regimes which explains much of their variety. A regime approach can
shed some light on the relative strength of various interest groups and institutions and
this helps to explain some of the system dynamics. But it does not address deeper ques-
tions about what drives adoption of performance regimes or whose interests they serve.
These issues could be addressed by drawing on Dean’s (1999) analytics of government
framework, which helps to focus attention on questions of power, privilege and control
and could help to uncover the invisible rationalities for introducing performance regimes
which are belied by the managerialist rhetoric usually employed by policy-makers and
auditors.
How might the concept of a performance regime be developed in the future
to advance our understanding of approaches to performance assessment?
Given that different approaches to performance assessment and improvement are often
described as regimes, it is important to consider what this means in analytical terms.
We have argued that identifying the key dimensions of a performance regime and using
these as an analytical framework provides a more robust basis for comparing different
approaches to performance management than merely describing them in broad-brush
terms. We have demonstrated the appropriateness of Hood et al.’s risk regulation frame-
work as a starting point for this dimensional analysis. We have also shown how Talbot’s
institutions and instruments framework complements this analysis and can be applied to
regimes which operate at different ‘levels’, including individual WOAs, the performance
improvement systems of which WOAs are part and broader public service reform strate-
gies.
Our analysis has also considered how and why regimes change over time. Hood et al.’s
and Talbot’s frameworks can help tomap changes, but to understand the drivers of change
we need to draw on other frameworks. Pollitt et al.’s analysis of endogenous and exoge-
nous factors (internal logics and external shocks) is a starting point, but there is a need
to develop a richer understanding of system dynamics as part of regime analysis. There
are benefits in combining different frameworks in this way in order to develop a more
rounded perspective of a regime. But it is important to guard against the danger of reifica-
tion. In the final analysis, regimes are analytical constructs rather than directly observable
entities. Moreover, there are two gaps in our analysis that we believe future researchmight
usefully seek to address.
First, we have not sought to evaluatewhetherWOAswere effective in driving improved
performance in local government. None of the theoretical frameworks on which we drew
were concerned with the impacts of a regime, and as we have discussed elsewhere, there
are formidable measurement and attribution problems associated with attempts to assess
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the impact of CPA, BVA and WPI (Martin et al. 2010). Nonetheless, a regime analysis
has the potential to inform a theory-based or realist evaluation of their impacts because
it can unpack how WOAs operate: the theories of improvement which underpin them,
the different contexts in which they operate and the control mechanisms which they use.
A regimes perspective could also help to identify misalignments in design or implemen-
tation which could undermine a regime’s legitimacy, coherence and durability (May and
Jochim 2013) – for example, a mismatch between policy ambitions and the available polit-
ical, financial and/or technical resources.
Second, our analysis has focused primarily on the surface features of the three perfor-
mance regimes we have studied. We have not blindly accepted the rhetoric associated
with these regimes or relied solely on normative descriptions of their operation. So, in a
sense, we have scratched the surface to consider how they operated in practice. However,
we have not sought to uncover the invisible rationalities that sit behind these regimes, as
would be suggested by Dean’s (1999) analytics of government framework, although our
analysis does point to their existence. For example, we found that all three performance
regimes were underpinned by largely unspoken theories of improvement and that they
were refined and, in the case of CPA, replaced as successive governments and ministers
sought to make their own mark.
In conclusion, we believe that applying the concept of performance regimes adds new
insights but also has limitations. Any framework privileges somequestions, bringing some
issues to the fore andpushing others into the background. In particular,we have found that
while studying the constituent parts of a performance improvement regime is extremely
valuable, it does not necessarily capture the essence of its operation. Nor does it tell us
much about the underlying forces which have led to the growth of particular approaches
to performance assessments and their trajectories over time. Answers to these questions
may require the application of different theoretical perspectives. In particular, we believe
there could be merit in adopting a dual perspective that combines mainstream regimes
analysis (of the type provided in this article) with the kind of discourse analysis which has
been advocated by Dean.
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